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THE COURTS, THE POLICE, AND THE REST OF US
HERBERT L. PACKER*
We stand today at a moment of comparative
pause and quiet in the kinetic and turbulent devel-
opment of the relation between the courts and the
police in this country. This moment is symbolized
by two events or, more accurately, non-events. The
five post-Escobedo cases which will, at least for the
near term, plot the course of the landmark deci-
sion have been briefed and argued in the Supreme
Court but still await decision.' Significant proposals
for legislative resolution of a host of vexing ques-
tions about police practices have been submitted by
the draftsmen of the American Law Institute's
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure but
have not yet been acted upon by that august body.
2
This moment of repose will not last. The cases
will be decided in one or possibly more of the sev-
eral ways open. The American Law Institute will
place its seal of approval on some or all or none of
the proposals laid before it. And life will go on.
But in this rare moment of repose, fleeting as it is,
there is an opportunity to reflect on where we are
and to consider some of the long-run implications
of the situation in which the agencies of the crim-
inal process today find themselves. It is that op-
portunity which, with your indulgence, I want to
avail myself of today. I also ask your indulgence,
which I suspect will be readily forthcoming, for not
inflicting upon you yet another detailed analysis of
the Court's decisions or of the A.L.I. proposals.
Let me start by eschewing specific prediction but
at the same time engaging in some generalized
forecast. The Supreme Court will probably not
overrule Escobedo,3 by which I mean nothing more
than that they are not likely to hold, now or in the
foreseeable future, that a suspect in police custody
who wants to talk to his retained lawyer who is at
that moment in the station house trying to talk to
him can be interrogated until his request is com-
plied with. Nor on the other hand, do I think the
* Professor of Law, Stanford University.
'The cases were decided in a consolidated opinion,
Miranda v. Arizona, 86 S.Ct. 1602 (1966) after this
paper had been delivered and set in type.
2 AmERICAN LAW INsTiTuTE, A MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARAiGNmENT PROCEDURE (Tentative Draft No.
1, March 1, 1966).
3 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
Court will hold, now or in the near future, that a
lawyer must be supplied to every person in police
custody before he can be interrogated.
I will go further. A confession will in the future
probably be excludable if the Court finds that itwas
obtained after arrest, in the police station, and
without a warning to the arrestee that he is not
required to speak, that anything he says may be
used as evidence, and that a lawyer, a relative or a
friend may have access to him upon his request.
Many police agencies, including the F.B.I., adhere
to this practice, the A.L.I.'s Draft Code requires
it, and I will make bold to assert that, if Escobedo
means anything, it means that.
One final prediction, and I will have done with
this hazardous game. In those jurisdictions where,
as the District of Columbia now appears to be
about to do, 4 a legal aid or public defender agency
arranges to have counsel made readily available on
a round-the-clock basis to indigent arrestees who
request this service, a police officer who fails to
divulge this fact to an arrestee, or who refuses to
accede to .the request when made, and who insists
on interrogating despite this failure or refusal, is
playing with fire. A confession so obtained will
probably be held to be excludible.
It will be asked whether law enforcement can live
with this state of affairs. It will be asserted that it
cannot. I do not propose to enter into this contro-
versy, except to note that for the first time we are
now beginning to get some data, however frag-
mentary, on the role that confessions play in the
criminal process. Justice Sobel's study of 1000 in-
dictments in New York s and the Detroit police de-
partment's study of the effect of warnings to ar-
restees6 represent a welcome beginning to the long
and arduous process of substituting facts for sur-
mise and prejudice in evaluating the role of con-
fessions in the criminal process.
The confessions problem is, as I have said, only
4 See N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1966, p. 20.
'N.Y. Law journal, Nov. 22, 1965, p. 1.
6The study is described in N.Y. Times, Feb. 28,
p. 18. It is summarized in a letter dated Dec. 17, 1965
from Vincent W. Piersante of the Detroit Police De-
partment to Prof. Jerold Israel of the University of
Michigan Law School.
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one among many issues that occupy us today. Five
years ago all the talk at meetings such as this one
was about the effect of Mapp v. Ohio7 on police
search and arrest practices. Five years before that,
it was the Mallorys rule. Since Mapp we have had
in rapid succession a series of decisions-Gidon, 9
Douglas,0 Malloyn Griffin,"2 to mention only a
few-that promise profoundly to influence law en-
forcement practices at the police and prosecutorial
level. It is a mistake to look at each of these in iso-
lation and to argue about them as if they were
separate and discrete phenomena. They are not.
They represent a trend which needs to be identified
and analyzed as such. Let us consider what this
trend is, what forces have shaped it, what it por-
tends for the future, and what kind of response to
it should be forthcoming from the agencies of law
enforcement.
As I have elaborated elsewhere, 3 the kind of
criminal process that we have is profoundly af-
fected by a series of competing value choices which,
consciously or unconsciously, serve to resolve ten-
sions that arise in the system. These values repre-
sent polar extremes which, in real life, are subject
to almost infinite modulation and compromise. But
the extremes can be identified. The choice, basi-
cally, isbetween whatI have termed the Crime Con-
trol and the Due Process models. The Crime Con-
trol model sees the efficient, expeditious and
reliable screening and disposition of persons sus-
pected of crime as the central value to be served by
the criminal process. The Due Process model sees
that function as limited by and subordinate to the
maintenance of the dignity and autonomy of the
individual. The Crime Control model is adminis-
trative and managerial; the Due Process model is
adversary and judicial. The Crime Control model
may be analogized to an assembly line, the Due
Process model to an obstacle course.
What we have at work today -is a situation in
which the criminal process as it actually operates
in the large majority of cases probably approxi-
mates fairly closely the dictates of the Crime Con-
trol model. The real-world criminal process tends
to be far more administrative and managerial than
it does adversary and judicial. Yet, the officially
7367 U.S. 643 (1961).
8 Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
" Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
"Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
"3 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 118
U. PA. L. REv. 1-68 (1964).
prescribed norms for the criminal process, as laid
down primarily by the Supreme Court, are rapidly
providing a view that looks more and more like the
Due Process model. This development, with which
everyone here is intimately familiar, has been in
the direction of "judicializing" each stage of the
criminal process, of enhancing the capacity of the
accused to challenge the operation of the process,
and of equalizing the capacity of all persons to avail
themselves of the opportunity for challenge so
created.
The nature of the trend is obvious enough. What
has brought it about and how durable is it? A
definitive answer to this question would compre-
hend a large slice of the history of our times, but
I should like to venture a few tentative and specu-
lative observations on the point. Let us start with
the Supreme Court itself. To some extent, the
Court's decisions are not simply evidence of the
trend but are in themselves a contributor to it.
Typically, the Court's intervention in any given
phase of the criminal process has started with a
highly particularistic decision dealing on a narrow
basis with the facts of a particularly flagrant or
shocking case brought before it. That was true of
the first right to counsel case, Powell v. Alabama,
4
and it was true also of the first confession case,
Brown v. Mississippi."5 The confession cases are
particularly instructive on this issue. For approxi-
mately twenty years following Brown v. Missis-
sippi, a number of confession cases came before the
court. As the standards it sought to lay down
emerged, they placed great emphasis on the "spe-
cial circumstances" of the cases. A given confession
was deemed involuntary because of the defendant's
personal characteristics-illiterate, of low inteli-
gence, immature, a member of a disadvantaged
minority group-or because of coercive forces at
work in the interrogation process, or because of
some combination of these factors. In those deci-
sions, the Court tried, among other things, to in-
fluence police behavior by dealing, in its traditional
way, with the facts of the specific case before it.
But the gap between aspiration and reality proved
too great to bridge in the Court's traditional way.
And so, the movement has been to ever increasing
generality of statement: from this confession was
coerced for the following particularistic reasons
unique to this case, to all confessions are bad when
they are obtained from an arrestee who has not
14 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
15 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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been promptly brought before a magistrate, as in
the famous Mallory rule announced for the federal
criminal courts in 1957. Escobedo may perhaps turn
out to mark the beginning of a similar line of gen-
eralized development for the state courts.
The great criminal procedure decisions of the
last few years can all be regarded as exemplifying
this movement toward increasingly generalized
statement, sparked by the court's despair over the
prospect of significantly affecting police practices
through its more traditional activity. The court has
sensed a law-making vacuum into which, rightly or
wrongly, it has seen itself as having to rush. Mapp
v. Ohio, in extending the exclusionary rule on un-
reasonable searches and seizures to the state courts,
was explicitly based on the proposition that no
other presently available means of control held out
any hope for deterring police disregard for the
dictates of the Fourth Amendment (which had
been held applicable to the states in Wolf v.
Colorado,'6 in 1949). Gideon v. Wainwright substi-
tuted a blanket rule on right to counsel explicitly
because the earlier case-by-case approach of Belts v.
Brady7 had failed to bring about universal com-
pliance with what the court perceived as needed
reform in the provision of counsel to indigent de-
fendants.
Moves of this sort by the Supreme Court are, in
my view, moves of desperation. Nobody else is
exerting control over the law enforcement process,
so the justices think that they must. But they can
do so, in state cases at any rate, only in the dis-
charge of their duty to construe the Constitution
in cases that come before them. And so, the rules of
the criminal process, which ought to be the subject
of flexible inquiry and adjustment by law-making
bodies having the institutional capacity to deal
with them, are evolved through a process that its
warmest defenders recognize as to some extent
awkward and inept: the rules become "constitu-
tionalized." The Bill of Rights becomes, as Judge
Henry Friendly's gibe has it, a code of criminal
procedure. 18
It is easy enough to poke holes in, not to say fun
at, this development. But what it represents is an
increased consciousness that our criminal process
in its everyday functioning does not live up to
minimum standards of fairness or, for that matter,
of efficiency. That increased consciousness comes
16 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
17 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
is See Friendly, The Bill of Rights As A Code of
Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. Rxv. 929 (1965).
from a number of sources, of which I shall mention
only two.
Perhaps the most powerful propellant of the
trend toward the Due Process Model has been pro-
vided by the Negro's struggle for his civil rights
and the response to that struggle by law enforce-
ment in the Southern states-as well, it needs to be
said, by law enforcement in some Northern cities.
What we have seen in the South is the perversion
of the criminal process into an instrument of official
oppression. The discretion which, we are reminded
so often, is essential to the healthy operation of law
enforcement agencies has been repeatedly abused in
the South: by police, by prosecutors, by judges and
juries. Police brutality, dragnet arrests, discrimi-
natory official conduct may be debatable issues in
the cities of the North; but they have been dem-
onstrated beyond doubt in the streets of Selma
and Bogalusa and a dozen other Southern com-
munities. Powers of arrest and prosecution have
been repeatedly and flagrantly abused in the in-
terest of maintaining an illegal, not to say uncon-
stitutional, social system. We have had many re-
minders from abroad that law enforcement may be
used for evil as well as for beneficent purposes; but
the experience in the South during the last decade
has driven home the lesson that law enforcement
unchecked by law is tyrannous.
I do not wish to be understood as suggesting that
the imputation of the abuses that I have mentioned
to law enforcement generally is rational or fair. I
simply suggest that it has taken place. As Walter
Arm, former Deputy Police Commissioner of New
York in charge of community relations, recently
observed: "Never before have public expressions of
confidence in police been so meager."' 9 He added
that the status of New York's police has suffered
because "the New York patrolman was automati-
cally equated with the 'red-necked sheriff'; and the
New York department was criticized for the use of
police dogs and fire-hoses in the South, although no
such measures were ever employed-or thought
of-in our city."'
0
As we all know, the Negro's plight is also, and at
least as importantly, a problem of urban poverty
in the large cities of the North and West. Our
heightened national consciousness about the prob-
lems of urban poverty likewise contributes to and
sustains the trend in the direction of the Due Proc-
ess Model. The urban Negro's plight is joined to
19 N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1966, p. 38.
20 Ibid.
[Vol. 57
SUPREME COURT AND THE POLICE
that of the Puerto Rican, the Mexican-American,
and other submerged groups. Law enforcement
may not be a cause of social injustice, but it must
reckon with the consequences of social injustice. It
is broadly recognized that the urban poor, and
particularly those who belong to minority groups,
provide most of the raw material for the criminal
process. As the idea develops and is promoted by
governmental programs that the legal rights of the
poor require special attention, politically and eco-
nomically muscular pressure for reforms in the
criminal process continues to make itself felt.
It is far from clear that this powerful trend is
going to continue at anything like the velocity that
it has exhibited in the past few years. I suspect
that any sharp accentuation of the Viet Nam war,
to mention only the most obvious factor, will tend
to slow down the rate of change in the criminal
process. However, the trend may well be in its
broad outlines irreversible, if for no other reason
than that once the problems have become visible,
it is unlikely that the national sense of injustice
(to borrow Edmond Cahn's phrase),a whether
manifested by the Supreme Court or by other
agencies of government, will be easily turned off.
Making whatever allowances one ought to make for
consolidation or swings of the pendulum, it would
still represent the worst kind of wishful thinking
for law enforcement people to believe that they can
persuade those who need to be persuaded that all
is for the best in this best of possible worlds.
If I am right about the nature of the present
trend (of which there seems little doubt) and about
its durability (about which there may be more), the
question arises: howshouldlaw enforcement officials
adapt themselves to the drastically changed legal
environment in which they must henceforth oper-
ate? By "law enforcement officials" I mean pri-
marily those who have executive or supervisory
responsibility over the rank and file members of
police departments, ranging from commissioners
and chief inspectors down through the ranks to
desk sergeants. Although I define the term that
broadly, I will admit that my remarks are directed
mainly to the men at the top, for reasons which I
think will become dear as I proceed.
The police are a sorely-tried group-there is
none more so in our society-and I do not propose
that their burdens should be increased. Indeed, I
would venture to assert that if the mood I am about
to suggest were to become prevalent, the burdens
21 See CAmn, THE SENSE oF INJUSTICE (1949).
devolving upon the police might both appear and
be lighter than in the past. My first bit of advice is
simply this: calm down. Repeated experience with
the procedural innovations thrust upon the crimi-
nal process by the Supreme Court has demon-
strated, if it has demonstrated anything, that the
dire predictions of imminent doom that seem auto-
matically to follow each new departure are, to put
it mildly, overstated. Whether they are genuine or
simply tactical, these outbursts of emotion do
nothing except possibly convince many who are
basically sympathetic with the demands of law en-
forcement that where there's smoke there's fire.
I do not by any means suggest that the police
should roll over and play dead. Constructive par-
ticipation in the current dialogue between the
courts and law enforcement is, to paraphrase
Holmes, not a duty but only a necessity. "Con-
structive participation" does not include, in my
view, the kind of name-calling to which some law
enforcement people seem habitually to resort when
things are not going quite as they would like them
to.
It is widely recognized that community relations
is a major problem facing the police today. But it
is often overlooked that the community in question
is wider than simply those parts of the population
with whom the police come most often in contact.
It includes opinion leaders of all sorts, including the
country's intellectuals and-a point which seems
to me too often ignored-it includes the Supreme
Court itself. To anywhere from five to nine mem-
bers of the Court, depending on how hair-raising
the facts of the particular case appear to be, the
police are suspect. I do not think that the discretion
which all or almost all disinterested observers agree
the police must have in dose cases will be un-
grudgingly afforded so long as the courts-and this
is by no means limited to the Supreme Court-re-
main unconvinced that the police regard the rights
of the accused as anything but a nuisance and an
impediment.
This attitude toward the police will not be
changed by words. It will take deeds. As an in-
stance of what I am talking about, let me refer to
the current controversy over civilian participation
in the police disciplinary process. In selecting this
instance to discuss, I do not mean to suggest that
I regard "the" civilian review board as a panacea
or as the incarnation of the good, the true and the
beautiful. Indeed, the entire controversy has be-
come unreasonably polarized because of the un-
196
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substantiated extremes to which both proponents
and opponents have gone. More subtly, a good deal
of the problem inheres in the reification of the
civilian review board, in the notion that there is a
"thing" called a "civilian review board" which
must be either embraced or rejected in its entirety.
Nothing could be further from the truth, and I am
surprised that the astute men who direct our police
departments have seemingly failed to realize it.
The reason that the civilian review board issue
has become such a hot one is precisely because it
exposes the nub of the controversy over police prac-
tices. As I have suggested elsewhere,22 the question
of just what the rules are by which the police
should be made to govern themselves in their phase
of the criminal process may be less important than
the question of how those rules, whatever they are,
are to be enforced. If I may take the liberty of
quoting myself:
"In today's crisis of confidence, the question
of sanctions is the central question. The main
source of hostility to the police among minor-
ity groups is the helpless frustration engen-
dered by the certain knowledge that, whatever
the police do, there is no way in which they can
be called to account for it .... No code of po-
lice practices that does not provide effective
sanctions for police lawlessness can so much
as begin the long repair job that will be re-
quired to win minority group acceptance of
even the most necessary police functions."
I do not think that the police can any longer
have it both ways. They cannot enjoy the discre-
tion which it is argued they need and at the same
time insulate themselves from effective outside
scrutiny of how they exercise that discretion. As
long as the criminal process in the courts has to
serve as the only effective vehicle for the correction
of abuses, through the reversal of convictions, the
courts will go on policing the police. It is in the
long-run interest of law enforcement to develop
viable alternatives.
There can hardly be any disagreement with the
following proposition: "A review board procedure
serves two basic functions: maintaining discipline
within the Department and satisfying citizen com-
plainants. A procedure that satisfactorily performs
one function does not necessarily discharge the
22 Packer, Policing the Police: Nine Men Are Not
Enough, New Republic, Sept. 4, 1965, p. 17.
2 3Id. at 21.
other."' ' That statement, with which, as I say, it
seems difficult to disagree, is the predicate for the
recommendation, now historically controversial, by
Mayor Lindsay's law enforcement task force that
a seven-man review board, consisting of four civil-
ians and three police officers, be set up to supplant
the existing three-man police board.
I do not suggest that the task force's precise
recommendation on this score should have been
accepted without change. Nor do I want to take
sides in the acrimonious and in some ways tragic
dispute or series of disputes which this recommen-
dation appears to have engendered. I use the New
York case simply as an example of the problem.
What I do wish to say is simply this: that a po-
lice response in totally negative terms to proposals
of this kind seems to me both wrong in principle
and strategically foolish. First, for the principle. I
do not understand it to be argued that any civilian
(which means to say, non-police) role in the police
disciplinary process is inappropriate. The argu-
ment is over the appropriate structure and timing
of civilian intervention. Must it inhere purely in
the political check that is always available or is
there room at the adjudicative level for a civilian
voice to be heard? To reject categorically and in
advance the idea of any civilian participation seems
to me to deny that the police are a part of society.
Be that as it may, nothing could be more injurious
to the notion that the police are responsive to com-
munity relations, than the indignant, not to say
hysterical root and branch opposition to any and
all such proposals.
The sensible strategy for the police, it seems to
me, is not to reject the idea of a civilian review
board but rather, to accept it, to domesticate it, to
make it their own. There are a number of ways to
do this. First, let us consider the question of board
composition. There is no a priori reason why the
administration and disposition of complaints
against the police should have to be in the hands ex-
clusively of police or exclusively of outsiders. There
is every reason why both should be present. As to
who should have a majority, the very question is
wrong-headed because it implies that there are two
monolithic opposing groups involved-the police
and the outside world. Are the police so convinced
they are not living up to community standards that
they think a majority of outsiders would be solidly
24 Report to Mayor-Elect John V. Lindsay by the
Law Enforcement Task Force Appointed for the Period
of Governmental Transition, p. 15, Dec. 31, 1965.
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against them? One among many possible compro-
mises would be to provide for a majority of civilians
but to afford some opportunity for police participa-
tion in the screening process leading to appoint-
ment. My own guess is that it would not make any
difference who had a majority on a board of mixed
composition.
Second, it makes a great deal of difference
whether the board has independent disciplinary
powers or simply has a recommending function.
Much of the expressed opposition to such boards
appears to rest on the view that is is anomalous for
outsiders to mete out discipline to the police.
Neither the Rochester nor the Philadelphia review
structures in fact confers the actual power to im-
pose sanctions on the civilian board. The power is
purely a recommending one.n And it is worth
noting that the Philadelphia board, which is the
only one that has had a sustained experience, has
clearly not produced results loaded against the po-
lice. For example in 1961-62, 108 cases were dosed.
96 were settled to the satisfaction of the complain-
ant without hearing or the complaint was with-
drawn after investigation. In the 12 cases in which
a hearing was held, there was a decision adverse to
the policeman in only 6.26
Third, there is a variety of devices available to
ensure that the all-important investigative func-
tion-ascertaining the facts underlying a complaint
against the police-does not fall into unfriendly
hands. Indeed, the Philadelphia board relied ex-
clusively on the police department for doing its
investigative work-"
These are simply a few examples of the innumer-
able nice adjustments that can be made in satisfy-
ing the demand for a civilian voice in the disci-
plinary process while at the same time guarding
against excesses of retaliatory zeal. The question
is whether this avenue for improving community-
police relations is to be blocked off, and those rela-
tions worsened, because of the obdurate and mas-
sive resistance of the police.
The arguments, if they can be called that, ad-
vanced by representatives of police fraternal orders
would lose most of whatever potency they have if
they were not so warmly supported by high-rank-
ing police executives. Indeed, there is a kind of
self-fulfilling prophecy at work here. The rank and
25 See Note, The Administration of Complaints by
Civilians Against The Police, 77 HAv. L. R1v. 499,
511-16 (1964).
26Police Advisory Board of the City of Philadel-
phia, Fourth Annual Report, Appendix A.
27Note, note 25 supra at 515.
file police say that any kind of civilian interference
will result in decreased morale. Their superiors sup-
port this. As a result, the introduction of civilian
participation very likely will cause a serious de-
crease in morale, at least in the short run. But no
disinterested observer will take that kind of self-
inflicted injury seriously. If the top echelon of po-
lice executives cease to feed the ignorant and hys-
terical fears expressed at the bottom, the morale
problem will solve itself.
The appeal I make is an appeal to enlightened
self-interest. It may be objected that there is no
reason why the police should yield any ground to
their critics. An improved public image alone, it
may be said, will not justify such concessions. As
one who finds the image of "image" a distasteful
one, I am inclined to agree. However, more solid
advantages should accrue in the long run. If I am
right in supposing that many of the restrictions
now imposed on the police arise because of an im-
plicit lack of confidence in the capacity of the police
to discipline themselves, it should follow that a
demonstrated amelioration of that problem should
produce a greater willingness on the part of courts
to give the police the discretion which they so
constantly assert they need. There is something
very anomalous about police protests against both
the exclusionary rule and proposals for civilian
participation in the police disciplinary process. The
exclusionary rule was imposed on the states in
Mapp precisely because no other sanction for law-
less police conduct appeared to be available. If al-
ternative devices are not merely available but are
espoused and developed with the active participa-
tion of police, it does not seem to me utopian to
suggest that the day may come when we do not set
a criminal free simply because the constable has
blundered, when the exclusionary rule becomes
simply one among several devices for controlling
the exercise of police discretion. Civilian participa-
tion in the disciplinary process is only one, and
perhaps a minor, aspect of the evolution of such
devices. I have dwelt on it because it is the one
currently most pressed, and therefore the one that
provides a testing case for the hypothesis that what
the police really want is to be free of all external
control. Unless the responsible leaders in police ad-
ministration concern themselves actively with dis-
proving that hypothesis, the courts will continue to
see themselves as the only mediators between the
police and the rest of us, with results that will
continue to be pleasing to no one, least of all to the
police.
